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One of the most dramatic changes in the World Bank’s approach to development over 
the last ten years has been its new commitment to governance improvements and in 
particular to fighting corruption in some of the poorest countries in the world. Driven 
by evidence that corruption reduces growth and investment in developing countries, 
the Executive Board of the Bank approved its anti-corruption strategy in September 
1997, defining corruption as the “use of public office for private gain”. According to 
the strategy, the Bank was to address corruption along four dimensions: preventing 
fraud and corruption in Bank projects, helping countries which request Bank 
assistance for fighting corruption, mainstreaming the concern with corruption in all of 
the Bank’s work and lending active support to international efforts in fighting 
corruption. These concerns were reflected in the World Development Report of 1997 
and have been central to the subsequent concern of the Bank with governance and 
institutional reform. More recently, the Bank has argued that “there is nothing more 
important” than the fight against corruption (World Bank 2000). The immediate 
effects of these policy announcements have been a much greater degree of concern 
with accountability within the Bank. At the same time, there has been a closer 
examination of the corruption and governance implications of Bank policies. Some 
older policies now have their anti-corruption content more openly expressed, in other 
areas there are new emphases. Thus Bank support for programmes involving 
liberalization, reforms of the civil service, “rightsizing the state” and privatization 
were given renewed impetus with an emphasis on the anti-corruption and governance 
improvement aspects of these reforms. In addition, there was a shift towards new 
areas for the Bank such as support for decentralization, devolution and 
democratization, and for greater civil society participation in monitoring developing 
country states.  
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While the renewed implicit recognition of the importance of the state in economic 
development is very welcome, the Bank’s approach to corruption and governance 
failures is fundamentally deficient in a number of ways. First, it is still based on a 
perception of economic development where success is driven by efficient markets 
supported by non-interventionist states. This theoretical perception is not based on the 
historical evidence of late-developers, particularly in Asia, and as a result, the 
prescriptions it offers regarding the desired features of a state which can best carry out 
developmental functions is not necessarily appropriate for most developing countries.  
 
Secondly, and closely related to the first problem, the empirical data showing a strong 
relationship between corruption and poor development is flawed. While it is 
undoubtedly the case that corruption imposes large costs on investors and on society, 
and high levels of corruption undoubtedly undermine the social fabric if it goes on for 
too long, there is no evidence that successful developers first fought and won the battle 
against corruption and then developed. Rather, the evidence strongly suggests that in all 
the successful developers, from South Korea in the sixties to China today, corruption 
was rife during the period of early capitalist development. Why is there no example of a 
developing country which was corruption-free at an early stage of development? The 
answer that poverty breeds corruption is wrong because poor people are often 
scrupulously honest. Rather, the process of capitalist development itself generates 
powerful incentives and motives for corruption. Without excusing corruption, 
international agencies have to face up to the fact that the construction of capitalism, 
while it may be necessary for the long-term prosperity of poor countries, is itself an ugly 
and confictual process. Attempts to attain a corruption-free, representative and 
accountable system of governance at this stage may not only not be achievable, but may 
divert attention from what actually needs to be done to improve the quality of state 
intervention to accelerate the transition and make it more socially acceptable.  
 
The historical evidence tells us that the early stages of capitalist development are periods 
of great social disruption and serious and sustained political instability in most countries. 
There is also very often a great deal of justified resentment and conflict as a new 
capitalist class emerges and begins to enjoy a life of conspicuous consumption and 
political influence. It is also a period when new areas of production and expertise are 
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being developed and markets and institutions often need to be reconstructed to serve 
new needs and require careful regulation and support. This combination of social 
discontent which creates strong incentives for clientelism and political corruption, and 
necessarily intrusive state regulation creates an environment where it is almost 
impossible to fight all corruption at the same time. Indeed to set the fight against 
corruption as a goal may exacerbate the sense of social injustice and instability since it is 
virtually impossible to achieve sustained reductions of corruption without overcoming 
the transition itself. The appropriate response must be to make sure that growth-reducing 
and anti-developmental types of corruption are attacked if the effort of governance 
reform is not to be dissipated in a series of futile gestures. The types of programmes 
which the Bank still recommends, now in support of anti-corruption, such as 
liberalization, downsizing the state, decentralization and even democratization may not 
be relevant for addressing the problems of state failure or even for fighting corruption in 
most developing countries facing this transition (though democratization in particular 
may be desirable for other reasons).  
 
While all developing countries seem to have had a high degree of corruption, this does 
not mean that an analysis of corruption is unimportant. On the contrary, by examining 
the types of corruption in dynamic and not so dynamic developing countries, we can 
learn important lessons about which types of governance reforms are actually required to 
accelerate growth and attain relative prosperity. In successful developers, corruption 
could co-exist with growth because it was part of a system of “primitive accumulation” 
through which a new class of capitalists emerged with strong state assistance and often 
in collusion with state leaders. State functionaries shared in some of the new wealth but 
were also able to discipline capitalists to ensure that inefficiency did not sustain itself, 
infrastructure was not too badly constructed, and that domestic resources did not fly to 
foreign banks. In the less dynamic countries, while bureaucrats and politicians also 
captured wealth, paradoxically they often captured a lot less in absolute terms because 
they failed to discipline capitalists, failed to maintain social order, failed to construct 
good infrastructure, failed to control capital flight, and in the end, failed to generate 
growth. The subsequent sustainability of dynamic states has depended on how 
successful they were in institutionalizing the new power and wealth which capitalist 
development created while opening up (often very gradually) to greater popular 
participation in decision-making. Thus a historical examination of the data on corruption 
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provides a very different set of prescriptions for states suffering from growth-reducing 
types of corruption and sustained state failure. It also suggests that none of the anti-
corruption policies of the Bank necessarily helps poorly performing countries to acquire 
the state capacities or political settlements which allowed dynamic countries to grow 
rapidly. Indeed, some of the new policies may actually make the transition period more 
difficult. The challenge for international agencies such as the Bank is to question the 
ideological self- image of capitalism which has been driving policy in ways which have 
made the construction of capitalism more difficult. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following sections. In the first section we 
look at the nature of the empirical evidence on which the Bank and other international 
organizations have based their anti-corruption strategies. Though this evidence is often 
presented to support mainstream approaches such as that of the Bank, a closer look at 
the evidence shows that it is incompatible with the mainstream analysis of market-driven 
development. Rather it is consistent with a very different story about the nature of 
capitalist development and the role of the state. In the next two sections we examine the 
main components of the Bank’s anti-corruption strategy. In the second section we look 
at the strategy of reforming and downsizing the state. In the third section we look at the 
Bank’s foray into apparently political areas such as reforms promoting decentralization, 
devolution and civil society participation. Finally, in the fourth section we argue that 
while the Bank appears to have been willing to take on board “political” reform as part 
of its governance improvement strategy, the mainstream approach on which it is based 
ignores critical aspects of the role of the state during the capitalist transition. Taking on 
board the historical evidence provides a very different set of strategies involving the 
strengthening of state capacity in developing countries to promote accumulation, 
discipline the market and maintain social order. Such a strategy would hit hard at types 
of corruption which are based on unproductive groups capturing resources by using their 
political and social power. It would not necessarily remove or even seek to remove all 
types of corruption and it would certainly not raise unviable expectations that this can be 
achieved if only the political will were there. A reduction of corruption across the board 
is unlikely without sustained economic development combined with the political and 
organizational reforms appropriate for more advanced economies. 
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1. The Anomalous Evidence on Corruption 
It is not surprising that the relationship between governance failures and corruption on 
the one hand and development on the other is complex and varies substantially across 
countries. This is because state policies, the organization and structure of societies, the 
level of economic development and the types of technologies which are being used 
differ greatly between countries. Nevertheless, the dominant econometric relationships 
which have inspired much of the mainstream international interest in corruption-
reduction have been staggering in the simplicity of the relationship they have identified. 
Typically, they have sought to show a relationship between an index of corruption and a 
measure of developmental success such as the rate of growth or the share of investment 
in the economy. There are serious measurement problems in trying to capture the extent 
of corruption in a country in one number. To make matters worse, corruption cannot be 
objectively measured and so the figures we have are actually subjective rankings of 
countries based on the perceptions of different groups of observers. Subjective indices 
are clearly not very satisfactory and in addition they suffer from the serious problem that 
observers may perceive corruption to be more serious in poorly performing countries 
than in more dynamic countries even if objectively they have the same degree of 
corruption. This may then give rise to the misleading conclusion that higher corruption 
was associated with poorer economic performance. There is no need to discount these 
exercises completely but we have to be aware of the limitations of the data. 
 
The strongest empirical relationship which is observed is between corruption and per 
capita GDP. This relationship is unfortunately not very interesting because it tells us 
nothing about causality. It could be underdevelopment which was responsible for 
corruption rather than the other way around. A much more interesting relationship is 
between corruption and the rate of growth of GDP. If a relationship existed here, it 
would be much more compelling evidence that corruption had an effect on development. 
The econometric relationship here is much weaker but Mauro (1995) provided the first 
regressions which showed a significant relationship between these variables. However 
the negative effect of corruption on growth was initially found to be weak and 
disappeared when the investment rate was included as a variable explaining growth 
rates. In later work it was shown that some negative effect remained even when 
investment was included as an explanatory variable in the regressions (Mauro 1996). 
This result, and others which followed from it, provided the precise empirical basis for 
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international agencies such as the IMF (where Mauro was based) and the World Bank to 
make corruption a direct policy target.  
 
Apart from the size and significance of the effect of corruption on growth, a closer look 
at the data shows a much more important problem with the interpretation of the 
regression result. A graphical plot of corruption against growth shows that the asserted 
negative relationship is arguably based on an inappropriate exercise which combines 
countries at different levels of development. Countries have different levels of 
corruption depending on their level of development (remember that the strongest 
relationship of corruption is with the per capita GDP of a country). Thus most advanced 
capitalist countries have much lower levels of corruption than most developing 
countries. Most advanced countries also have reasonably well working economies and 
manage to chug along at a steady pace over the years.  
 
In contrast, most developing countries (and particularly the poorest ones) have been in 
an economic mess over the last two decades or more, often with low or negative rates of 
growth. Their underdevelopment is associated with some of the highest corruption 
indices. However, a few developing countries have done extremely well, and have 
managed to far exceed the rates of growth achieved in the advanced countries. Of 
course, we expect developing countries to do this if they are ever to have a chance of 
catching up with the absolute living standards of the advanced countries. The problem is 
that these high growth developing countries did not have significantly lower levels of 
corruption than other developing countries (allowing for the fact that they were rapidly 
becoming richer) during their catching up period. Figure 1 presents these observations in 
a simplified diagram.  
 
The downward slope of the fitted regression line could be explained by the fact that 
relatively few countries were located in box 3, the group of underdeveloped countries 
which were growing rapidly enough to begin converging with the advanced countries. 
Regressions are based on numbers of observations, and so the experience of the high-
performance countries are swamped out as outliers even though they were often very 
populous countries and even though their experience is of great significance for 
understanding the process of development.  
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The policy conclusions which the Bank and the IMF derives from these regressions is 
summarized in the arrow going leftwards and upwards from box 2 to box 1. Simply by 
looking at the negative slope of the line, it is concluded that in order to move towards 
the performance of the advanced countries, poorly performing countries must first 
reduce corruption, even though there is no historical observation of this ever happening. 
In contrast, a historical examination of the data suggests a quite different trajectory 
shown by the arrow going from box 2 to box 3 and only subsequently to box 1. This 
trajectory suggests that a prior reduction of corruption is a misrepresentation of the 
conditions which led to developmental success, even though the successful countries 
must have gone through significant governance reforms which allowed them to take off. 
Our reading of the evidence does not reduce the importance of governance reforms, 
interpreted as reforms of the state, but forces us to treat with caution many of the policy 
conclusions which have uncritically become very widespread. Nor does such a reading 
of the evidence suggest that corruption is not a problem which we should be worried 
Figure 1 The Relationship Between Corruption and Growth 
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about. Rather it suggests that the real difference between developing countries which 
begin to converge with advanced countries and those which remain behind has more to 
do with political and institutional reforms which changed the types of corruption they 
suffered from and not just, or even primarily, the extent of corruption (Khan 1996a, b). 
The importance of distinguishing between types of corruption, and more generally, types 
of rent-seeking is developed further in Khan and Jomo (2000). 
 
In the subsequent sections we will focus on how the World Bank has led other 
multilaterals in developing an anti-corruption strategy in developing countries based on 
the dominant interpretation of the relationship between corruption and growth 
summarized above. We will evaluate these strategies not only in terms of how likely 
they are to reduce corruption per se but also in terms of how relevant they are for 
promoting early capitalist development. 
 
2. Bank Anti-Corruption Strategies: “Rightsizing” the State 
Having identified corruption as a cause of underdevelopment with measurable effects on 
the growth rate and on investment, the Bank, together with other multilaterals, have 
identified a set of mechanisms through which corruption can be reduced. These 
mechanisms draw heavily from an implicit underlying neoclassical model of rent-
seeking where corruption and other forms of rent-seeking are driven by a) the ability of 
the state to create rents which distort the economy and reduce welfare and b) the 
inability of society to discipline and punish those who seek to capture and share these 
rents both legally (through processes such as lobbying) and illegally (through processes 
such as corruption). The fight against corruption is therefore presented as a two-pronged 
one. The first prong is to limit the ability of the state to create rents which in any case 
lower welfare. The second prong is to combine this with mechanisms which reduce the 
incentives of bureaucrats to be corrupt, for instance by increasing salaries (which are lost 
if they are caught and fired) and improving the monitoring and judicial systems (to 
improve the probability of being caught and fired in the first place). The World 
Development Report of 1997 follows this scheme very closely, arguing that countries 
which have higher corruption have  
 
a) A higher “policy distortion index” (for which read a greater dive rgence from a 
notional free market and lots of state-created rents). The logic is that the greater the 
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“rents” associated with state restrictions, the greater the incentives for businessmen and 
ordinary citizens to bribe to capture these rents or overcome these restrictions. 
b) A lower opportunity cost of being caught in the act of corruption (in the form of 
lower civil service to manufacturing salary ratios). The lower the opportunity cost, the 
greater the incentive of bureaucrats to accept bribes since even if they are caught and 
fired, they do not lose much. 
c) A less meritocratic bureaucracy (more political appointments and fewer exam-based 
appointments). This means that bureaucrats have a short time horizon and are more 
willing to make money fast rather than be worried about their career prospects in the 
long run. 
d) A lower predictability of the judicial system (measured by a lower probability of 
getting caught and being brought to justice). This too increases the incentive of 
corruption by making punishment less sure. 
 
These observations, of course, mark no significant break with the policies which the 
Bank had been following for many years. Lowering the “distortion index” is entirely 
consistent with conventional Bank policies of rightsizing the state. These involved 
liberalizing the economy, getting rid of  government interventions in the form of 
subsidies, tariffs and quotas, privatizing public sector enterprises which suffered from 
excess employment and distorted prices, and in general, getting the state out of all 
activities which either distorted the market or which in theory the private sector could 
do. All that was now being added was the recognition that not only did these distortions 
have the direct welfare costs which were well known, but in addition they had a much 
bigger indirect impact by encouraging corruption (and other forms of rent-seeking), 
making it even more important to attack these problems. However, the Bank did seek to 
distance itself from the more extreme neo- liberals by recognizing the role of the state in 
providing essential public goods including “law and order”, primary education and 
health care and some infrastructure as well. Thus the emphasis on “rightsizing” rather 
than “downsizing” the state, emphasizing the importance of getting the state to focus on 
its core tasks (even increasing its capacity to do these things) while getting it out of 
regulating and creating incentives for industrialization and catching-up, for instance, 
which inevitably created rents and encouraged rent-seeking. At the same time, the Bank 
approach stressed the importance of having a well- trained professional bureaucracy 
which was well-paid, together with a monitoring and accountability system which 
 10 
ensured that bureaucrats were held to account and fired or prosecuted if they failed to 
perform their duties or if they broke the law (World Bank 1997).  
 
While the Bank approach may appear to be a balanced one, it is actually based on a very 
specific interpretation of the role of the state during development and of the institutional 
drivers of development. Underlying these prescriptions is the belief that free and 
unfettered markets are the best driver of development in poor countries provided that the 
state created a basic legal framework and provided essentia l public goods. Any 
additional state intervention and the associated rents which such intervention inevitably 
creates is not only not necessary, but is a massive hindrance to development. But in fact 
the historical evidence of rapid late development tells a very different story. Despite 
significant differences in the details of policy interventions across the high-growth 
developing countries, a common feature characterizing virtually all of them was 
concerted rent-creating state intervention. State interventions were critical in managing 
the processes through which new capitalist classes emerged by acquiring capital and 
technology. The flow of real resources into the hands of newly emerging capitalists was 
orchestrated through a variety of mechanisms including state control over or ownership  
of banks, controls or distortions of prices, interest rates and exchange rates, and directly 
through taxes and subsidies. Even more important, particularly in the dynamic 
economies, was the discipline which the state could impose on the newly emerging 
capitalist class to ensure that these resources were not significantly wasted, and that 
potential capitalists who failed to become productive lost out and resources could be 
transferred to others. States also played an essential role in maintaining political stability 
through judicious resource transfers and redistributions, not always organized legally or 
publicly. Finally, states had to create new institutions for regulating markets and 
managing economic stability where pre-existing economic institutions were largely 
inadequate. Aspects of these processes have by been well-documented (Amsden 1989, 
Wade 1990, Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara 1997, Khan and Jomo 2000). 
 
From the perspective of these historical observations, paring down the state to a 
corruption-free rump which somehow provides “law and order” in a poor and conflict 
torn economy and which restricts itself to providing primary education and some 
essential infrastructure may be suggesting a blueprint which is both impossible to 
achieve (in its law and order objective) and which will doom the poorest economies to at 
 11 
best a moderate economic performance. The provision of a semblance of political 
stability may be impossible in most developing economies without the hidden political 
transfers which are a source of political corruption. And a state which actually 
disengaged itself from the task of accelerating capitalist accumulation and disciplining 
emerging capitalists would doom the economy to much slower progress. But what is 
even more serious, from the perspective of this chapter, the evidence suggests that the 
policy package of rightsizing does not even achieve the limited objective of actually 
reducing corruption (regardless of the subsequent effects on growth).  
 
The evidence of the last two decades strongly suggests that liberalization and 
privatization are often associated with an increase in corruption rather than the reverse. 
This is most obvious in the case of Russia and Eastern Europe. It is also the case in less 
well recognized cases such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh where the liberalization of 
the eighties and nineties were associated with very dramatic increases in corruption as 
reported in corruption indices. In a review of anti-corruption strategies for the 
Operations Evaluation Department of the Bank, Huther and Shah (2000) look at the 
relevance of the main strategies in developing countries. They argue that some strategies 
such as introducing ombudsmen and raising public awareness of corruption is unlikely 
to have any effect on countries where governance is poorest. But while they accept that 
privatization had negative effects in Russia (Huther and Shah 2000, Table 2) they still 
argue that reducing the size of the state, increasing citizen participation and (somehow) 
improving the rule of law are still the best strategies in countries with the worst 
governance record. In fact the systematic evidence that privatization and liberalization 
result in increased corruption is difficult to reconcile with the neoclassical perspective 
sketched above but not with a perspective which recognizes that the environment for 
corruption is closely related to the stage and pace of the capitalist transition. 
Liberalization and privatization accelerates the creation of capitalists and dramatically 
increases the stakes for those who want to enter the new class or expand their stake in it. 
Corruption and rent-seeking are bound to increase in this context, the irony is that 
without a strong state regulating the process the outcome is not even likely to be 
efficient, as the case of Russia, Pakistan and many other countries show.  
 
What about the more pragmatic reforms suggested by the mainstream analysis: raising 
bureaucratic salaries and improving accountability? Here the theoretical justification has 
 12 
come under attack from within mainstream economics itself, and the evidence too is 
very disappointing. Higher salaries are theoretically expected to lower corruption 
because they increase the opportunity cost of corruption provided there is some 
probability of being caught and fired (Gould and Amaro-Reyes 1983, Klitgaard 1988). 
High wages for bureaucrats operate like efficiency wages. It may be efficient to not only 
pay civil servants the market wage for their skill level, but indeed a rent on top of that. 
This is because the work which bureaucrats do is often difficult to monitor and the rent 
(or efficiency wage) creates an additional incentive for honest service delivery given a 
sufficiently high probability of getting caught and fired. This incentive mechanism 
breaks down if the probability of getting caught, and/or of being actually fired when 
caught, is very low (Besley and McLaren 1993, Huther and Shah 2000). In that case, the 
higher salary is just a bonus since the bureaucrat can continue to be corrupt. The cross-
national empirical evidence shows, as expected, that there is very little if any 
relationship between bureaucratic pay increases and the reduction of corruption 
(Treisman 2000, Rauch and Evans 2000). And finally, coming back to our bigger picture 
of growth and development, there is, as we have already pointed out, little evidence that 
bureaucrats and politicians in fast-growing economies were actually squeaky clean. Just 
think of contemporary China or South Korea in the seventies.  
  
3. Decentralization, Devolution and the role of Civil Society 
To complement its existing policies of liberalization and rightsizing, the Bank has been 
increasingly persuaded that it needs to support explicitly political reforms to increase the 
accountability of the state and to reduce the discretion available to bureaucrats. Thus 
anti-corruption strategies now include, in addition to the types of reforms discussed 
earlier, a commitment to decentralization to reduce the discretion available to 
bureaucrats and a commitment to more public oversight through support for democracy 
and a “vibrant” civil society (World Bank 2000: 21). Driving these reforms is an 
underlying model of a developing economy where society is composed of individuals 
with well-defined endowments who would go ahead and develop the economy 
according to their comparative advantage if left to their own devices. They only need the 
state to provide them with law and order and basic public goods and this they can ensure 
by holding the state accountable. Decentralization and devolution enhances their ability 
to do this by bringing government closer to the final customers of state services. As 
before, we need to examine how sensible these strategies are in terms of the relevance of 
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their underlying theories for the real situations in which they are being applied. We can 
also look at the evidence to see if corruption is lower, and secondly if welfare higher in 
developing countries which have devolved and decentralized systems.  
 
In the conventional service-delivery model of the state, the relationship between the 
electorate, politicians and bureaucrats is shown in Figure 2. In this picture, the electorate 
are the consumers of government services. They are supposed to elect and put pressure 
on politicians to translate their demands and requirements for services into policy. 
Politicians in turn are supposed to monitor and control the bureaucrats to ensure service 
delivery (but they may collude with bureaucrats to subvert the popular will). Note that 
the role of government in this perspective is simply to deliver services which the public 
collectively and democratically desire. Decentralization refers to administrative changes 
which give lower levels of government greater administrative authority in delivering 
services. Devolution involves in addition changes in political institutions so that electors 
vote for representatives at lower levels of government who in turn have effective control 
over lower level bureaucrats involved in service delivery. Clearly, no system is entirely 
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centralized or devolved, but a devolved system has more aspects of service delivery and 
regulation managed by lower tiers of government who are in turn answerable to lower 
level politicians. Clearly not all services and regulatory functions are suitable for 
devolution. Some government activities like building inter-city highways may not be 
divisible to local government without loss of efficiency. Thus devolution refers to a 
greater proportion of divisible services being delivered through a devolved system.  
 
If the state is primarily there to deliver services for the electors, decentralization, and in 
particular devolution will plausibly improve accountability and governance by bringing 
government closer to the people. This will make it easier for the latter to monitor and 
discipline the state. Service delivery should improve and corruption should decline. But 
this plausible argument requires a number of stringent conditions to hold if it is to be 
true. The effectiveness of governance from this perspective depends on the three sets of 
relationships marked in Figure 2:  
 
i) First, the arrows from the Electorate to the Politicians indicate the role of elections and 
other political processes in communicating the objectives of the electorate to political 
representatives. How effective are these processes in communicating the real interests of 
the electorate? To what extent are these processes controlled by privileged groups within 
the electorate? If the electorate as consumers are to get the services they really want, the 
first condition is that the electoral process should reveal the real preferences of the 
electorate. To compare a devolved with a more centralized system, the relevant question 
here is whether the electorate is more likely to formulate general social interests in 
elections for local politicians rather than for national or regional politicians. 
 
Public choice theory tells us that democracy is unlikely to reveal “social preferences” if 
individuals in society have widely divergent preferences (Mueller 1989: esp. 58-95). 
The view that democracy can allow the electorate to formulate clear demands even for 
service delivery ignores the possibility of deep divisions between classes and groups in 
society. These divisions are particularly intense during periods of rapid social transition. 
Under these conditions, democracy is even less likely to reflect “common interests”. 
Indeed in developing countries democracy appears to systematically bypass the interests 
of the bulk of the voters. Instead, the political system typically reflects the interests of 
relatively small groups of organizationally powerful clients who control the electoral 
 15 
process financially and organizationally. For devolution to result in better governance 
even in terms of the service provision model, devolved elections have to result in a more 
accurate reflection of the popular will and break down the tendency towards the capture 
of political power by sectional interest groups.  
 
Clearly devolution is likely to make some difference. The size of local constituencies is 
usually much smaller and so the same population will ultimately be electing a much 
greater number of politicians at the local level than at higher levels. Arithmetically, local 
politicians are likely to represent social interests to a greater extent simply because they 
are more numerous and a greater variety of interests are likely to be represented. On the 
other hand, the disparity of organizational and financial power can be as great within a 
village cons tituency as a parliamentary constituency since the latter is simply an 
agglomeration of the former. So while local politicians are likely to reflect the interests 
of a more broad-based elite than national politicians, it will still be an elite nonetheless. 
More importantly for development, the interests of this local elite need not be more 
developmental compared to the elite represented at higher levels.  
 
The evidence from India’s considerable experience with local government suggests that 
service delivery has been most successful in states such as West Bengal and Kerala 
where elections have been contested in the context of centralized party structures with 
strong developmental and welfarist goals. However imperfectly, these centralized party 
structures were better able to represent general interests precisely because they were 
mass parties and had a high degree of centralization in terms of agenda setting and 
mobilizational power (see for instance, Williams 1999). In other parts of India where the 
electorate is fragmented, devolution has usually not resulted in a more accurate 
reflection of popular demands. Devolved political power has reflected the interests of 
relatively small groups of well-organized elites.  
 
ii) The second area where devolution could make a difference is shown by the arrows 
from Politicians to Bureaucrats which describe the exercise of control by politicians over 
civil servants. This control can either ensure that the latter carry out their duties and 
deliver what the public requires but it can also result in political intervention or collusion 
which benefits politicians and their clients, and sometimes bureaucrats as well. In 
extreme cases where politicians are excessively motivated by clientelism, the control 
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exercised over bureaucrats by politicians can even be against the general interest. This 
argument has often been used and misused by dictators to subvert the political process, 
particularly in developing countries. The question for devolution and decentralization is 
whether local politicians are more likely to be able to control local bureaucrats in the 
public interest and less likely to direct them or collude with them to benefit sectional 
interests compared to national politicians and higher level bureaucrats. 
 
There are a number of reasons why this expectation may be not hold in many developing 
countries. First, local politicians usually lack sufficient constitutional powers to 
effectively sanction bureaucrats. This problem may be exacerbated by the fact that in 
most developing countries, the educational and status gap between politician and 
bureaucrat may be far greater at the local government level than at higher levels. But 
more importantly, we have to ask if local politicians are more or less likely to engage in 
collusive corruption with bureaucrats compared to provincial and national politicians? 
There is no general answer to this question which is valid everywhere. But given what 
we have already said about unequal access and clientelism at all levels of society, the 
propensity for collusion should be no less at the local compared to higher levels. In 
addition, there are many more points of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats 
in a devolved compared to a centralized system, it is very difficult for the national press 
and senior investigators to watch what is happening at the local level and it is often 
easier for local elites to intimidate their opponents and get away with overt corruption 
than it is for national politicians. For these reasons, local level corruption is often no less 
and is sometimes proportionately much greater than corruption at higher levels. Clearly, 
there are no general reasons to believe that devolution will work to improve governance 
and reduce corruption in every case. 
 
iii) Finally, the arrows from Bureaucrats to the Electorate shows the delivery of services 
which in turn are the source of welfare improvements or welfare reductions for final 
consumers. For the electorate to be able to respond to government there has to be a 
transparent chain of responsibility for specific services or interventions. The case for 
devolution and decentralization in terms of this relationship rests on the assumption that 
in devolved governments it is easier for the electorate to identify those responsible for 
particular decisions.  
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However, this expectation critically requires that there are no complementarities of local 
services with those provided by other units or funding requirements from higher levels 
of government. Otherwise, it would be relatively easy for local service providers to 
attribute their own failures to others, or indeed, their failures may actually be due to 
others. But in either case it would be very difficult for local consumers to decide without 
a lot of expenditure on information collection. In fact bureaucrats in devolved systems 
frequently invoke these arguments even in sophisticated advanced economies, 
sometimes justifiably and sometimes not. Indeed if we move beyond the simplest 
service delivery to look at the types of activities which a developing country state has to 
engage in, such as maintaining law and order, accelerating the creation and 
consolidation of an efficient capitalist class and encouraging technological progress, 
complementarities and spillovers between localities and regions means that there is no 
effective sense in which local monitoring of service delivery can attribute praise or 
blame to local bureaucrats. Not only that, the fragmentation of jurisdictions in the 
presence of complementarities can result in an excessive extortion of bribes by 
bureaucrats and politicians because bribe-collectors in each jurisdiction are unaware of 
the negative effects of their activities in other jurisdictions (Treisman 2000, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993). 
 
These theoretical caveats are supported by empirical work which has sought to find a 
relationship between devolution and decentralization on the one hand and corruption on 
the other. Treisman (2000) in a major cross-country study finds federal states to be more 
corrupt than unitary ones. Fjelstad and Semboja (2000) find decentralized fiscal 
administration in Tanzania to be highly corrupt because of weak monitoring from above. 
Goldsmith (1999) points out how decentralized systems make it easier to hide corrupt 
practices in developing countries. On the other hand, some studies conducted for the 
Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank have found that devolution has 
reduced some types of corruption. Crook and Manor (2000) report that in Karnataka, 
India, devolution reduced grand theft even though petty corruption increased. In a cross-
country regression analysis including both advanced and developing countries, Gurgur 
and Shah (2000) report that decentralization has a significant effect in reducing 
corruption. But they also point out that when the regressions are carried out for 
developing countries alone, there is no relationship between decentralization and 
corruption-reduction. The latter result is more significant because including both 
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advanced and developing countries in the same corruption regressions has problems 
which we have touched on earlier. Finally, the fact that a configuration of factors 
allowed devolution to result in better governance and lower corruption in some cases 
does not contradict the general point that there is no general case in favour of 
devolution. To be fair, many Bank operatives in the field appear to be sceptical of the 
merits of pushing decentralization and devolution but the official position has strong 
backers within the Bank.  
 
There is a much stronger commitment within the Bank to the general proposition that 
greater civil society participation in monitoring government will improve governance 
and reduce corruption. The reasoning here is quite straightforward. The chances of 
catching the corrupt are supposed to increase with greater transparency. This increases 
the expected cost of corruption for the bureaucrat or the politician. If this was the case, 
we would expect countries with more freedom of information and more participatory 
politics to suffer less from corruption and poor governance. Once again, the underlying 
view of the relationship between state and society is the mainstream one where 
individuals in society have to be vigilant to ensure that the state they have set up to 
deliver services does not rip them off. This picture has no analysis of divisions within 
society and how competing interests may quite legitimately try to exercise voice and 
influence over the state in their own interests. In reality, those who are monitoring the 
state may have specific interests of their own and not everyone in society may have the 
resources, the knowledge or the organizational ability to exercise voice. If we take into 
account the real divisions which exist in developing country societies, we have to ask 
which groups are most likely to exercise voice and influence as transparency and 
accountability increases, and whether these groups are productive groups or not.  
 
Without in any way diminishing the desirability of democracy and participation as 
political values, such an analysis will be able to tell us if there is any reason to expect 
greater civil society participation in a particular country to actually result in general 
improvements in governance and corruption. In general, in most developing countries, 
capitalists are a very small group who lack social legitimacy because their wealth is 
often considered to be illegitimate and often actually is. They rarely play a predominant 
role in national politics or lead civil society organizations (though there are exceptions 
such as Thailand). Nor is the vast bulk of the population, composed of workers and 
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peasants able to play this role as they are typically too disadvantaged in terms of 
education and resources. Thus civil society organizations are dominated by the relatively 
narrow middle and lower middle classes who have the resources, the education and the 
numerical strength to play a dominant organizational role. However well-meaning, 
inclusive and humanistic their voice often is, these groups do not represent the interests 
of the whole society and more than that, they are often unaware of the harsh realities 
necessarily involved in the creation and operation of early capitalism. Their voice does 
little to change the underlying realities of primitive accumulation and political 
management in developing countries but does add to the list of expectations which 
cannot be met. These considerations mean that the relationship between greater civil 
society participation and economic development can be quite complex and can vary 
greatly not only between developed and developing countries, but also within 
developing countries themselves, depending on the constitution and organization of 
social classes and groups (see for instance Khan 1998). 
 
Once again, the importance of these considerations is borne out by the evidence. While 
it is difficult to measure the degree of civil society participation or how “vibrant” it is, 
the presence or absence of democracy offers a measurable proxy. The evidence on the 
relationship between democracy and corruption underlines why it is important to have a 
good analysis of social structure in developing countries. Case study evidence provides 
many examples of democratic developing countries where corruption is rife. Not only 
that, they also provide evidence of corrupt politicians whose corruption is well known, 
winning elections against clean campaigners who seek to unseat them, not least in the 
biggest and most sustained democracy in the developing world: India. Similar examples 
can be found in neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh. These cases cannot be explained 
by culture (which differs widely across the developing world), or the lack of 
information, since the corruption of particular leaders is often widely known and 
dissected in the press. Rather, we have to recognize that voting for machine politics 
patrons or mafia bosses is often a rational response on the part of voters in developing 
countries who can expect bigger payoffs and protection if they support the right factions 
than from a clean campaigner who is de-linked from the processes of political and 
economic accumulation. These case-study insights are confirmed by Treisman (2000) in 
his major cross-country regression analysis. He finds no evidence that corruption is 
lower in democracies. Democracy did have a small effect on corruption after many 
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decades but these long term effects could have other explanations because only 
successful economic developers are usually able to sustain long- lasting democracies.  
 
It is worth repeating that international agencies are not necessarily wrong to support 
greater civil society participation in developing countries as an end in itself, but they are 
wrong to raise expectations that this will necessarily improve the quality of governance 
or reduce corruption. If improvements in the quality of state intervention are sought, as 
indeed they should be, attention has to be focussed directly on what the state should be 
doing in a developing country trying to construct capitalism. The task of international 
agencies should then be to assist in developing state capacity in these areas. The focus 
on corruption is a damaging distraction even though corruption clearly imposes large 
social costs in developing countries. It is a damaging distraction because sustained 
reductions in corruption require development, and therefore the focus should be on 
improving the capacity of the state to govern in the interests of development. Such a 
strategy will have an incidental effect in reducing, as it must, growth-reducing types of 
corruption, but it is naïve to think that there will be substantial reductions of corruption 
in the short term.  
 
4. An Alternative Perspective on Reforming the State 
In the previous sections we have tried to show how the Bank’s approach to improving 
governance has been based on a service provision model of the state. In this perspective, 
the quality of provision is dependent on rightsizing the state so that it only delivers what 
the private sector cannot, and on keeping bureaucrats and politicians under check 
through political decentralization and more civil society participation. We have 
indicated why this perspective on the state is inappropriate in a developing country 
context. We have also referred to some of the evidence which strongly suggests that the 
strategies being followed by the Bank are not likely to lead even to a reduction in 
corruption, let alone to the greater welfare which is supposed to follow from a market-
led economy and a smaller, cleaner state. In this concluding section we will elaborate a 
little more on the types of fundamental economic and political problems which a 
developing country state has to address, and the types of capacity which it may have to 
develop if it is to carry out these tasks better. 
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In contrast to the service provision view of the state, we would argue that it is more 
appropriate to see the developing country state not only as the guarantor of social order 
but as one of the key agencies involved in creating a completely new social order. The 
capitalist transition is not something which happens naturally, nor is it something which 
is widely supported, particularly in its early phases. The construction and deepening of a 
capitalist society involves both supporting and promoting an emerging capitalist class 
and ensuring that this process of support is sufficiently disciplined for resources not to 
be wasted by the emerging “capitalists” turning out to be a class of unproductive 
conspicuous consumers. At the same time, the developing country state has to ensure 
that political stability is maintained at acceptable levels for the process of accumulation 
and investment not to get derailed. Both of these key areas of intervention open up 
massive opportunities for bureaucrats and politicians to share in or misappropriate some 
of the transfers which are necessarily involved in carrying out these tasks.  
 
Looking first at the economics of transition, the developing country state does not just 
have to provide services like clean water to citizens, more importantly, it has to aid and 
accelerate the creation of a class of capitalists. This in itself involves the state in deeply 
divisive decisions. If the right decisions are made, a class of capitalists will emerge who 
will help in generating prosperity for their country. But regardless of their productivity, 
the beneficiaries of state interventions are inevitably enriched to rise beyond the reach of 
the average citizen. While this is deeply divisive, no developing country state can sit 
back and be genuinely “neutral” in aiding all sections of society if economic viability 
depends on the rapid growth of the capitalist sector. Virtually all developing countries 
states have used mechanisms such as allocating land for industrial development, 
influencing relative prices particularly between agriculture and industry, managing taxes 
and subsidies, influencing exchange and interest rates and so on, to assist the emergence 
of the nascent capitalist class.  
 
The implicit transfers to the emerging capitalist class as a result of these policies has a 
significance which is well beyond even the very large sums involved because the 
individuals who emerge from this process as potential capitalists are able to permanently 
differentiate themselves from the rest of society. What would they be willing to pay to 
be beneficiaries of state policies at this stage? When society is differentiating into new 
classes in this way, the standard analysis of how much rent-seekers will be willing to 
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pay becomes deficient. Rent-seekers in this context will be willing to pay not only a 
fraction of the rent they can capture from the state, but perhaps a very large fraction 
given the long-term benefits they can hope to get by positioning themselves as emerging 
capitalists in the transition society. The transition state has to follow a difficult path: it 
cannot be expected to give no support at all to emerging capitalism without derailing 
development very significantly. On the other hand, if it does intervene, it has to try and 
ensure that the emerging capitalists cannot influence the allocation of resources in ways 
which derail technology acquisition and productivity growth.  
 
Ironically, if the state can ensure that emerging capitalists are efficient, it does not matter 
too much for economic dynamism if bureaucrats and politicians make some money in 
the process. Capitalists too, are usually only too happy to share some of their gains, 
particularly in the early stages of development. The real danger is when inefficient 
capitalists succeed in bribing or influencing the state to capture resources. When this 
happens, the cost to society is much greater than the resources wasted in corruption. The 
state may be systematically creating a class of conspicuous consumers rather than 
productive capitalists and wasting a huge amount of social resources in pampering a 
protected and unproductive class. Subsidies may be permanently captured by infant 
industries which refuse to grow up, and so on. The social costs of these policies are 
likely to dwarf the direct economic cost of the bribes. The institutional and political 
characteristics which have enabled a few developing country states to ensure that growth 
remained high during this transition period are not easy to summarize because what 
worked in each country depended on the internal social and political balance (see, for 
instance, Khan and Jomo 2000 for a discussion of some of these conditions).  
 
Some general features of the dynamic countries do, however, stand out. States which 
were able to discipline capitalists at this stage seem to have had either a very strong 
capacity to over-ride coalitions which formed to protect particular inefficient capitalists 
or sectors, or they had allies in society who shared an interest in ensuring that the 
emerging capitalists continued to get resources but did not waste them. Building these 
capacities and alliances was not simple and most developing countries did not succeed. 
However, lessons can be learnt from the successful countries to promote progress 
towards greater developmental commitment in countries performing less well. This 
certainly does not mean that Nigeria, say, should be encouraged to attempt South 
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Korean industrial policy, but it does mean that appropriate policies and state capacities 
have to be developed in Nigeria if it is to manage the transition at the fastest rate feasible 
given its political and historical conditions. But such an agenda could not be further 
from an agenda of “rightsizing” the state.  
 
The second and equally important challenge facing the developing country state is the 
maintenance of political stability in a context of intense social conflict and widespread 
resentment of the wealth and power of emerging capitalists. This resentment is 
widespread in developing countries not least because the processes of state support 
which assisted their emergence are widely known. This explains the apparent paradox 
that political instability is often greater in more open developing societies where 
information about the effects of government policies is more freely available and the 
possibilities of expressing dissent are greater. In these contexts, the maintenance of 
political stability usually involves political clientelism where powerful clients of 
political parties and the state get preferential access to resources and in return help to 
maintain stability. This in turn very often involves political corruption, since these 
resources obviously cannot be publicly accounted and audited. Political corruption of 
this type, while necessary for political stability, can be very damaging for the economy 
because these networks can also protect inefficient capitalists for a mutually beneficial 
price. The comparative evidence suggests that clientelism is not always consistent with a 
successful transition. Dynamic countries either suppressed clientelism or had fairly 
centralized versions of clientelism (Khan 2001, Khan and Jomo 2000).  
 
These observations suggest an extremely important area of political reform in 
developing countries. Responding to the problems posed by clientelism requires a 
sustained long-term reform of political processes. This involves not just trying to reform 
political parties but also requires a political leadership which is willing to engage in 
difficult political struggles against the mafia- like patrons and protection rackets which 
are widespread in developing countries. In areas such as this, international agencies 
could potentially play an important role in assisting developing country states. But here 
we find a real incomprehension of the problems faced by these states and an 
unwillingness on the part of international agencies to address problems of real politics. 
In contrast to the anodyne support for civil society and democracy, a program of support 
for political reform which can make developing country states less vulnerable to 
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clientelism would have directly positive effects for the economy. It would target 
precisely those types of political corruption which have a seriously negative economic 
effects and enable developing country states to maintain a higher level of efficiency 
during the difficult phase of early capitalism. For the fight against clientelism to succeed 
developing country states would have to maintain political stability through other means, 
and this would very likely require much more expenditure on transparent social 
programs and redistribution. But such strategies are not likely to find much favour in 
western countries committed to shrinking the developing country state and reducing 
international aid for developing countries. 
 
To conclude, a historical approach to the problem of corruption and poor governance 
suggests that the Bank’s approach does not address some of the most critical issues 
constraining the efficiency of state intervention in developing countries. Part of the 
reason for the Bank’s failure in this area can be found in the dominant economic 
orthodoxy which does not address the problem of the capitalist transition at all. Part of 
the problem also lies in an inadequate understanding of the politics of the transition and 
the role of different types of political corruption and clientelism in influencing the 
efficiency of state intervention in developing countries. This problem is potentially even 
more difficult to address because it requires a recognition of the inherent injustices 
involved in the construction of capitalism, and the inevitably less than satisfactory 
methods of accommodating political dissent in developing and transition economies. It 
requires a recognition that the metaphors of level playing fields, of freedom and of 
fairness, to the extent that they describe features of advanced capitalist countries, 
describe the emerging capitalisms in developing countries to a far lesser extent. This is 
not primarily because there is insufficient civil society participation or democracy but 
because the construction of capitalism is inherently divisive and often rewards and 
deprives individuals in arbitrary ways.  
 
Without understanding these issues it is not possible to understand the roots of political 
instability, of political clientelism and political corruption in different countries and how 
best to devise strategies which limit the growth-retarding effects of some types of 
clientelism and political corruption. It is understandable that this image of the capitalist 
transition is difficult to sell in advanced countries where funding and support for Bank 
policies have to be found. There is a very strong resistance to the idea that the rapid 
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deepening of capitalism in a developing country can itself be the source of different 
types of corruption which can only be addressed if the transition is successful, if it is 
rapid and if social cohesion can be maintained during it. Sadly, if a better understanding 
of the nature of the transition which developing countries have to go through does not 
emerge, the transition will be more protracted and fraught with greater tensions and 
conflicts than need otherwise have been the case. What is even worse is that the 
imposition of governance reforms which are inappropriate for the problems which 
developing countries actually face could contribute to worsening political instability by 
raising impossible expectations. 
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